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Humans can resist temptations by exerting will-
power, the effortful inhibition of impulses. But will-
power can be disrupted by emotions and depleted
over time. Luckily, humans can deploy alternative
self-control strategies like precommitment, the
voluntary restriction of access to temptations. Here,
we examined the neural mechanisms of willpower
and precommitment using fMRI. Behaviorally, pre-
commitment facilitated choices for large delayed
rewards, relative to willpower, especially in more
impulsive individuals. While willpower was associ-
ated with activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and inferior
frontal gyrus, precommitment engaged lateral fron-
topolar cortex (LFPC). During precommitment,
LFPC showed increased functional connectivity
with DLPFC and PPC, especially in more impulsive
individuals, and the relationship between impulsivity
and LFPC connectivity was mediated by value-
related activation in ventromedial PFC. Our findings
support a hierarchical model of self-control in which
LFPC orchestrates precommitment by controlling
action plans in more caudal prefrontal regions as a
function of expected value.
INTRODUCTION
Preventing temptations from derailing long-term goals is one of
the most universal and challenging problems faced by humans.
Because the subjective value of a reward declines as the delay to
its receipt increases (a process known as ‘‘temporal discount-
ing’’; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz,
2008), people are often lured toward choosing small immediate
rewards over larger delayed ones, even when such choices areclearly against one’s best interest. Overcoming the temptation
to choose immediate (but inferior) rewards requires self-control
(Ainslie, 1974; Hare et al., 2009). Struggles with self-control
pervade daily life and characterize an array of dysfunctional
behaviors, including addiction, overeating, overspending, and
procrastination.
Self-control can be implemented in various ways. The bulk of
research on self-control has focused on the effortful inhibition of
impulses, or willpower (also known as ‘‘delay of gratification’’;
Mischel et al., 1989; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Muraven and
Baumeister, 2000). People are often able to successfully resist
temptations even from a very young age (Mischel et al., 1989);
however, willpower is far from bulletproof. Research has shown
that willpower is less successful during ‘‘hot’’ emotional states
(Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue,
2004) and may be vulnerable to depletion over time (Muraven
and Baumeister, 2000).
But willpower is not the only means by which people resist
temptations. One notable alternative self-control strategy is pre-
commitment, in which people anticipate self-control failures and
prospectively restrict their access to temptations (Rachlin and
Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; Wertenbroch, 1998; Ariely and Wer-
tenbroch, 2002; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Fujita, 2011;
Elster, 2000). Examples of precommitment include avoiding
purchases of unhealthy food items and locking money away in
savings accounts with hefty early withdrawal fees. Notably, pre-
commitment often involves imposing costs for deviating from
long-term goals. Wertenbroch (1998) demonstrated that people
ration their access to ‘‘vices’’ like cigarettes and junk foods by
purchasing them in smaller quantities, even though they could
save money by purchasing them in bulk. Another study showed
that students self-imposed costly deadlines to avoid procrasti-
nation (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002). That people do this sug-
gests they are sometimes aware of potential temptations, which
makes (costly) precommitment decisions more valuable in the
long run relative to unconstrained decisions, which are vulner-
able to (more costly) self-control failures.
Even though precommitment is widely used as a self-control
strategy outside of the laboratory, and has been the subject ofNeuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 391
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willpower it has received far less attention from the empirical
behavioral sciences (Fujita, 2011), and the neural mechanisms
of precommitment remain unknown. In the current study, we
developed a behavioral method to directly test the effectiveness
of precommitment relative to willpower. We used this measure in
conjunction with fMRI to investigate the neural mechanisms of
precommitment and its relationship to other varieties of self-
control.
Previous studies of the neural basis of self-control have
focused primarily on willpower. These studies have consistently
implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in the
effortful inhibition of impulses during self-controlled decision
making (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Hare et al., 2009; Figner
et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010; Essex et al., 2012; Luo et al.,
2012). These findings converge with those of studies employing
measures of the ability to inhibit prepotent motor responses,
which also implicate the DLPFC and IFG (Aron et al., 2004; Chi-
kazoe et al., 2007; Simmonds et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2012). In
line with these studies, we expected to find increased activation
in DLPFC, IFG, and PPC when subjects deployed willpower to
actively resist temptations.
Meanwhile, the neural basis of self-control by precommitment
remains unexplored. Precommitment is nonnormative, in the
sense that a rational decision maker with time-consistent prefer-
ences should never restrict his choice set. But precommitment is
adaptive when willpower failures are expected. Thus, an optimal
precommitment strategy should require information about the
likelihood of willpower failures. One computationally plausible
neural mechanism is a hierarchical model of self-control in which
an anatomically distinct network monitors the integrity of will-
power processes and implements precommitment decisions
by controlling activity in those same regions. The lateral fronto-
polar cortex (LFPC) is a strong candidate for serving this role.
A recently proposed framework of executive decision making
places frontopolar cortex at the top of a cognitive control hierar-
chy, enabling goal pursuit by orchestrating diverging action
plans represented in caudal and lateral prefrontal regions
(Burgess et al., 2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Tsujimoto
et al., 2011). Activity in LFPC is associated with prospective valu-
ation and counterfactual thinking, processes that are critical for
comparing alternative courses of action (Daw et al., 2006;
Burgess et al., 2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Boorman
et al., 2009, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011; Tsujimoto et al.,
2011). At the same time, LFPC is implicated in metacognitive
appraisal and the assessment of confidence in both perceptual
and value-based decisions (De Martino et al., 2013; Fleming
et al., 2010) and has recently been suggested to represent antic-
ipatory utility during intertemporal choice (Jimura et al., 2013).
Based on these studies, we hypothesized that LFPC would be
activated during decisions to precommit and would show
increased functional connectivity with regions involved in
willpower.
In our study,male participants rated a set of erotic images, and
based on their ratings, we constructed personalized stimulus
sets consisting of small rewards (images rated slightly above
neutral) and large rewards (highly rated images; Table S1 avail-392 Neuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authorsable online). Participants then made choices between viewing
a small reward immediately (smaller-sooner reward, or SS) or a
large reward after a variable delay (larger-later reward, or LL).
We varied the decision characteristics across four experimental
task conditions (see Figure 1). In the Willpower task, participants
were required to actively resist choosing the SS, which was
available throughout the delay period as they waited for the LL.
In the Choice task, participants made an initial choice between
SS and LL; if they chose LL, they passively waited for the LL
during a delay period in which the SS was not available. In the
Precommitment task, participants decided whether to remove
their ability to choose the SS, thus committing to the LL. In the
Opt-Out task, participants decided whether to make a
nonbinding choice to wait for the LL; during the delay period,
the SS was still available, so they could reverse their choice at
any time. All tasks were economically equivalent in terms of
rewards, delays, motor responses, and trial durations, and par-
ticipants were informed of the duration of the delay at the time
of choice. Because all trials were equally long, to maximize
reward in this paradigm, participants should always choose LL.
We examined self-control (here defined as the proportion of LL
choices) across our experimental conditions in a behavioral
study (Study 1) and an fMRI study (Study 2).
RESULTS
Behavioral Task Validation
As a manipulation check, we first tested whether self-control
decreased as a function of delay. As expected, across all task
conditions, participants were more likely to choose LL at short
delays, relative to medium delays and long delays (Study 1:
F(2,114) = 153.24, p < 0.001; Study 2: F(2,40) = 41.02, p < 0.001;
Figure 2A).
To further validate our task as a measure of self-control, we
looked for evidence of preference reversals, i.e., instances in
which participants initially indicated a preference for LL but later
chose SS. Specifically, we examined choices in the Opt-Out
task, in which participants could make a nonbinding choice for
LL but could choose SS at any point during the delay period.
Since the SS was also available during the initial choice (Fig-
ure 1D), and at the time of choice participants knew the delay
length, choices for SS during the delay period are suboptimal in
terms of maximizing reward across time. Figure 2B displays the
proportion of SS choices during the delay period conditional on
initial choices for LL. We observed a substantial number of pref-
erence reversals (one-sample t test, Study 1: t(57) = 4.99, p <
0.0001; Study 2: t(19) = 3.94, p = 0.001), which increased as a
function of delay (Study 1: F(2,82) = 12.50, p < 0.0001; Study 2:
F(2,32) = 9.64, p = 0.001; Figure 2B). Preference reversals were
positively correlated with the proportion of SS choices in the will-
power task at a trend level in Study 1 and significantly so in Study
2 (Study 1: r = 0.251, p = 0.068; Study 2: r = 0.648, p = 0.002).
Precommitment Is a More Effective Self-Control
Strategy than Willpower
Despite the fact that all tasks had equivalent rewards and delays,
self-control differed across tasks (Study 1: F(3,171) = 17.51,
p < 0.001; Study 2: F(3,60) = 7.209, p < 0.001; Figure 2C). The
Figure 1. Experimental Task Conditions
Participants completed all four conditions, pre-
sented in random order. Each task consisted of a
decision phase (4,000 ms), a delay phase
(0–10,000 ms), and a reward phase (2,500 ms).
Participants chose between smaller-sooner (SS)
and larger-later (LL) visual rewards. Delay length
was indicated above the LL option. Solid lines
indicate reward available for selection, while
dashed lines indicate reward that is unavailable for
selection. Choice options were initially blue and
turned orange upon selection.
(A) In the Willpower task, participants had to
actively resist choosing the available SS reward
during the delay phase.
(B) In the Choice task, participants simply chose
the SS or LL reward during the decision phase. If
LL was chosen, the SS was unavailable during the
delay phase.
(C) In the Precommitment task, participants
decided whether or not to make a binding choice
for the LL (‘‘commit’’). Commitment decisions led
to a delay phase identical to that of the Choice task
(in which the SS was unavailable), while noncom-
mitment decisions led to a delay phase identical to
that of the Willpower task (in which the SS was
available).
(D) In the Opt-Out task, participants initially
decided whether to choose SS or wait for LL. LL
decisions led to a delay phase identical to that of
the Willpower task, in which the SS was available.
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were more likely to choose LL in the Precommitment task than
in the Opt-Out task (Study 1: t(57) = 5.64, p < 0.001; Study 2:
t(19) = 3.45, p = 0.003) and the Willpower task (Study 1: t(57) =
5.26, p < 0.001; Study 2: t(19) = 3.58, p = 0.002), as well as the
Choice task in Study 1 (Study 1: t(57) = 3.40, p = 0.001). Although
the mean proportion of LL choices in the Precommitment task
was greater than in the Choice task in Study 2, the difference
was not significant (t(19) = 1.00, p = 0.328), likely due to the
reduced sample size compared with Study 1. The task-related
pattern of choices was consistent across delays (i.e., the
task 3 delay interaction was not significant, Study 1: F(6,342) =
1.16, p = 0.330; Study 2: F(6,114) = 1.10, p = 0.369).
The improvement in self-control observed in the Precommit-
ment task varied across subjects, such that more impulsive indi-
viduals were more likely to benefit from precommitment. We
defined impulsivity, here, as breakdown of willpower; impulsivity
was therefore estimated as the proportion of SS choices in the
Willpower task. Improved self-control in the Precommitment
task (defined as the difference between the proportion of LL
choices in the Precommitment task and the average proportion
of LL choices across the other tasks) was positively correlated
with impulsivity (Study 1: r = 0.62, p < 0.001; Study 2: r = 0.50,
p = 0.020).
Willpower Engages DLPFC, IFG, and PPC
To identify brain regions involved in the effortful inhibition of
impulses, we examined neural activity during the delay period.
Such regions should be more engaged during delays in which
participants must actively resist the temptation to choose SS,relative to delays in which the tempting SS option is absent.
We compared blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity
during the delay period in the Willpower task, in which subjects
must continually resist the temptation to select the available
SS, with activity during the delay period in the Choice task, in
which the SS option was not available. Because we were inter-
ested in effective implementations of self-control, we restricted
this analysis to trials with LL outcomes only, thus controlling
for reward anticipation and delivery across conditions. We ex-
pected to find brain regions that have been previously associ-
ated with inhibition of prepotent responses, executive function,
and self-control (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Hare et al., 2009;
Figner et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2012; Essex
et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2012). Confirming our hypothesis, this
analysis revealed significant activations in bilateral DLPFC
(peak 50, 10, 32; t(19) = 14.39, p < 0.001, whole-brain family-
wise error [FWE] corrected), bilateral IFG (peak 44, 42, 10;
t(19) = 6.44, p < 0.001, whole-brain FWE corrected), and bilateral
PPC (peak32,52, 44; t(19) = 8.80, p < 0.001, whole-brain FWE
corrected) when subjects actively resisted temptations (Figure 3;
Table S2). Additional willpower-related activations were
observed in the cerebellum, ventral striatum, insula, posterior
cingulate cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus (p < 0.05 whole-
brain FWE corrected; Table S2).
Precommitment Engages LFPC
To investigate the neural correlates of precommitment, we
compared BOLD activity at decision onset during binding LL de-
cisions in the Precommitment task with activity at decision onset
during nonbinding (but otherwise identical) LL decisions in theNeuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 393
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Self-control (defined as proportion of LL choices) declined with increasing
delays.
(B) Preference reversals (initial choices for LL, followed by opt-out choices for
SS) increased as a function of delay.
(C) Self-control differed across task conditions; precommitment faci-
litated choices for LL in two independent studies. Data are represented as
mean ± SEM.
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LL outcomes only, to control for reward anticipation across con-
ditions. In line with our predictions, this analysis revealed activity
in left and right LFPC (peak 34, 58, 8; t(19) = 4.74, p = 0.014,
small-volume FWE corrected; Figure 4A and Table S3).
We performed additional analyses to test the selectivity of
LFPC activation to trials with opportunities to precommit. As in
our previous analyses, we focused on trials in which subjects
chose LL to control for reward anticipation across conditions.
First, we investigated whether the LFPC showed sustained acti-
vation when subjects actively resisted temptations by extracting
the Willpower contrast estimate from our region of interest (ROI)
in LFPC (34, 56, 8; Boorman et al., 2009). LFPC activation
was not significantly different from zero when subjects actively
resisted temptations (beta = 0.2653, SE = 0.4249, t(19) = 0.64,
p = 0.5294; Figure 4B). Directly contrasting BOLD responses
from Precommitment trials in which subjects chose to precom-
mit, against BOLD responses fromWillpower trials in which sub-
jects actively resisted temptations, revealed a significant cluster
in right LFPC (40, 56, 12; t(19) = 4.78, p = 0.039, whole-brain
FWE corrected) and a trend-level significant cluster in left
LFPC (26, 52, 12; t(19) = 5.11, p = 0.059, whole-brain FWE
corrected).394 Neuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The AuthorsNext, we examined the LFPC’s involvement in the three tasks
involving explicit decisions (Precommitment, Choice, and Opt-
Out). We extracted parameter estimates from our ROI in LFPC
based on a previous study (34, 56, 8; Boorman et al., 2009)
for LL decisions in the three decision tasks and conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA to compare LFPC activation across
tasks (Figure 4C). This analysis demonstrated a significant main
effect of task on LFPC activity (F(3,17) = 5.573, p = 0.008). Pairwise
post hoc comparisons revealed that LFPC activation was signif-
icantly greater during precommitment choices than during LL
choices in the Opt-Out task (t(19) = 3.83, p = 0.003, Bonferroni
corrected). The LFPC mean parameter estimate for precommit-
ment choices was also greater than that for LL choices in the
Choice task, but the difference did not survive correction for mul-
tiple comparisons, mirroring our behavioral self-control findings
(compare Figure 4C with Figure 2C). We note that the Choice
task, like the Precommitment task, also involves the opportunity
to make a binding choice for LL; our results therefore support the
notion that the LFPC is sensitive to the opportunity tomake bind-
ing choices for large, but delayed, rewards.
For comparison, we also investigated whether regions
involved in willpower (DLPFC, IFG, and PPC) were sensitive to
opportunities to precommit. We extracted parameter estimates
from these regions (using ROI coordinates from previous
studies; Table S8) during LL choices in the three decision tasks
and subjected them to a repeated-measures ANOVA. None of
these regions were sensitive to opportunities to precommit (Fig-
ure S1); the effect of task was not significant for DLPFC (F(3,17) =
1.676, p = 0.215), IFG (F(3,17) = 1.209, p = 0.322), or PPC (F(3,17) =
0.924, p = 0.415). Thus, DLPFC, IFG, and PPC showed activation
patterns consistent with their role in self-control more generally
but were not sensitive to opportunities to precommit.
Finally, we subjected the parameter estimates from LFPC,
DLPFC, IFG, and PPC for the three decision tasks to a
repeated-measures ANOVA with region and task as within-sub-
jects factors. Parameter estimates were z transformed to control
for differences inmean parameter estimates across regions. This
analysis revealed a significant interaction between region and
task (F(6,114) = 3.989, p = 0.001), confirming our above observa-
tions that the LFPC was differentially activated across decision
tasks, but the regions engaged during willpower (DLPFC, IFG,
and PPC) were not.
Functional Connectivity with LFPC during
Precommitment
We next investigated the possibility that LFPC implements deci-
sions to precommit by controlling activity in the DLPFC, in line
with theories positing that the LFPC sits at the top of a cognitive
control hierarchy from which it orchestrates different courses of
actions represented in DLPFC (Tsujimoto et al., 2011; Koechlin
and Hyafil, 2007; Burgess et al., 2007). This idea is particularly
intriguing because of the DLPFC’s prominent role in actively
implementing self-control (Hare et al., 2009). To test this hypoth-
esis, we conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
analysis with the seed in the LFPC cluster associated with pre-
commitment to identify regions showing increased functional
connectivity with LFPC at decision onset. The PPI analysis iden-
tified precommitment-related increases in positive functional
Figure 3. Willpower-Related Activations
(A) Bilateral DLPFC, bilateral PPC, and (B) bilateral IFG were more activated
when the temptation to choose the SS during the delay had to be suppressed.
Images are displayed at a threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected with an extent
of >10 voxels. See also Table S2.
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our willpower analysis, including DLPFC (t(19) = 4.23, p = 0.016,
small-volume FWE corrected), PPC (t(19) = 5.78, p < 0.001,
whole-brain FWE corrected), cerebellum (t(19) = 5.44, p =
0.006, whole-brain FWE corrected), and middle frontal gyrus
(t(19) = 5.10, p = 0.011, whole-brain FWE corrected; Figure 5A
and Table S4). A conjunction analysis confirmed that these
were indeed the same regions as those engaged during will-
power (Figure 5B). Thus, during precommitment decisions, the
LFPC increased functional coupling with regions also involved
in willpower.
Reward Circuitry Encodes the Expected Value of
Precommitment
Our behavioral analysis revealed that more impulsive individuals
were more likely to benefit from precommitment; in other words,
the expected value of precommitment differed across individ-
uals. This suggests that brain regions associated with value
computation should be engaged differentially during precommit-
ment as a function of impulsivity. We tested this hypothesis by
searching for precommitment-related brain regions that tracked
individual differences in impulsivity (defined by proportion of SS
choices in the Willpower task). To do this, we regressed individ-
ual differences in impulsivity onto the precommitment contrast
(binding LL choices in the Precommitment task relative to
nonbinding LL choices in the Opt-Out task). Note that the regres-
sor used in this analysis was computed from choices on different
trials than those used in the fMRI contrast. This analysis revealed
significant clusters in the ventral striatum (t(19) = 7.62, p < 0.001,
whole-brain FWE corrected) and vmPFC (t(19) = 4.91, p = 0.003,
whole-brain FWE corrected; Table S5), regions previously asso-
ciated with reward anticipation (Haber and Knutson, 2010).
Impulsivity Moderates LFPC Connectivity during
Precommitment
If the LFPC implements precommitment decisions as a function
of expected value, we might expect functional connectivity
between LFPC and willpower regions to differ as a function of in-
dividual differences in the expected value of precommitment.
Since individuals varied in the extent to which they could benefit
fromprecommitment, wewere able to examinewhether these in-
dividual differences predicted functional connectivity betweenLFPC and willpower regions. We conducted an ROI analysis by
extracting individual mean parameter estimates from clusters in
PPC and DLPFC identified independently in the previous PPI
analysis (10 mm spheres surrounding the coordinates in Table
S6) and regressed these values against individual differences in
impulsivity (asdefined inourpreviousanalysisof expectedvalue).
This analysis revealed that more impulsive individuals indeed
showed stronger functional connectivity during precommitment
between the LFPC and PPC (r = 0.90, p < 0.001; Figure 5C) and
between the LFPC and DLPFC (left: r = 0.72, p < 0.001; right:
r = 0.52, p = 0.019; Figure 5D). For completeness, we also con-
ducted a whole-brain analysis by regressing individual differ-
ences in impulsivity onto the PPI contrast. This analysis again
revealed stronger positive LFPC coupling with PPC and DLPFC
in more impulsive individuals, as well as IFG, MFG, and cere-
bellum (all p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE corrected; Table S6).
So far the data have shown that individual differences in impul-
sivity are positively correlated both with activation in reward
circuitry during precommitment and with connectivity between
LFPC and willpower regions during precommitment. These find-
ings suggest that the LFPC implements precommitment deci-
sions by driving activation in willpower regions and does so as
a function of the expected value of precommitment. To further
test this hypothesis, we examined whether activation in the
vmPFC during precommitment (Table S5) mediated the relation-
ship between impulsivity and LFPC-DLPFC connectivity during
precommitment (Figure 5D). To avoid nonindependence con-
cerns, we extracted parameter estimates from a region of
vmPFC identified from a previous study (Kable and Glimcher,
2007). Using hierarchical regression (Baron and Kenny, 1986),
we first demonstrated that vmPFC activation during precommit-
ment significantly correlatedwith LFPC-DLPFC connectivity dur-
ing precommitment (t(19) = 2.668, p = 0.016). A second regression
showed that impulsivity (proportion of SS choices during theWill-
power task) significantly correlatedwith vmPFCactivation during
precommitment (t(19) = 4.583, p = 0.002). Impulsivity also corre-
lated with LFPC-DLPFC connectivity during precommitment
(t(19) = 3.576, p = 0.002). Importantly, adding vmPFC activation
as a second predictor of LFPC-DLPFC connectivity removed
the effect of impulsivity (p = 0.405), and the indirect effect of
vmPFC activation on LFPC-DLPFC connectivity was significant
(Z = 2.42, p = 0.016), consistent with a mediating role (Figure 6).
Thus, our findings suggest a functional model whereby the
vmPFC evaluates the expected value of precommitment and
relays this information to LFPC, which then implements those
decisions via the DLPFC and PPC. Such a model would also
imply an increase in functional connectivity between vmPFC
and LFPC during precommitment, again as a function of the
expected value of precommitment. This was indeed the case;
our PPI model with the seed in LFPC showed an increase in
LFPC-vmPFC connectivity during precommitment as a function
of impulsivity (peak8, 40, 6; t(19) = 6.33, p = 0.01, small-volume
FWE corrected; Table S6).
DISCUSSION
We provide behavioral evidence demonstrating that precom-
mitment is an effective strategy for promoting self-control. InNeuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 395
Figure 4. Precommitment-Related Activa-
tions
(A) LFPC was activated when participants made
binding choices for LL rewards, relative to
nonbinding choices for LL rewards.
(B) LFPC was not significantly activated when
subjects actively resisted temptations during the
delay period of the Willpower task (relative to the
delay period of the Choice task).
(C) In the decision tasks, LFPC activation was
sensitive to the opportunity to make binding
choices for delayed rewards. Images are dis-
played at a threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected with
an extent of >10 voxels. Data are represented as
mean ± SEM. See also Figure S1 and Table S3.
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obtain superior but delayed rewards when they had the oppor-
tunity to make a binding choice for the delayed option in
advance, relative to when they simply had to wait for the de-
layed reward in the presence of a tempting inferior option.
Notably, our experimental setting provided a tightly controlled
comparison of the effectiveness of different self-control strate-
gies: different task conditions were economically equivalent in
terms of rewards, delays, and trial durations. Nevertheless, par-
ticipants were less likely to receive large delayed rewards when
they had to actively resist smaller-sooner rewards (Mischel
et al., 1989), compared to when they could precommit to
choosing the larger reward before being exposed to temptation
(Ainslie, 1974).
Consistent with previous research (McClure et al., 2004, 2007;
Hare et al., 2009; Figner et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010; Cohen
et al., 2012; Essex et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2012), we found that
effortful inhibition of the impulse to choose a tempting but inferior
reward was associated with strong activation in the DLPFC, IFG,
and PPC during the waiting period. Precommitment was associ-
ated with activation in the LFPC. The LFPC was more active dur-
ing precommitment than during willpower and was more active
when subjects had the opportunity to make binding (relative to
nonbinding) choices for LL rewards. These activation patterns
suggest that the LFPC is sensitive to the presence of opportu-
nities to precommit and may play a role in deciding whether to
precommit.
The LFPC has been previously associated with metacognition,
counterfactual thinking, and prospective valuation (Daw et al.,
2006; De Martino et al., 2013; Gilbert et al., 2006; Burgess396 Neuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authorset al., 2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007;
Boorman et al., 2009, 2011; Charron
and Koechlin, 2010; Rushworth et al.,
2011; Tsujimoto et al., 2011). These
cognitive processes are all expected to
play a role in precommitment, which
may involve recognizing, based on past
experience, that future self-control fail-
ures are likely if temptations are present.
Previous studies of the LFPC suggest
that this region specifically plays a role
in comparing alternative courses of ac-tion with potentially different expected values (Daw et al.,
2006; Boorman et al., 2009, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011), a pro-
cess that may rely on prospective (‘‘look-ahead’’) working mem-
ory capacity (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Charron and Koechlin,
2010). Our findings provide further support for this hypothesis
in the context of self-controlled decision making.
A functional connectivity analysis demonstrated that during
precommitment decisions, the LFPC showed increased
coupling with the DLPFC and PPC. These regions have consis-
tently been implicated in willpower, both in the current study
and many others (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Hare et al., 2009;
Figner et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2012; Essex
et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2012). The LFPCmay therefore access in-
formation about the strength of willpower processes from the
DLPFC and PPC when assessing the potential benefits of pre-
commitment. Previous fMRI studies of self-control suggest that
the DLPFC promotes self-control by enhancing the weight of
long-term goals in the neural computation of outcome values
(Hare et al., 2009). The LFPCmay therefore integrate information
about long-term goals provided by the DLPFC when assessing
the potential benefits of precommitment. Meanwhile, the PPC
may be involved in the implementation of precommitment deci-
sions, acting as an interface between value computations and
motor outputs. Two previous studies have reported coactivation
of the LFPC and the PPC during exploratory decision making
(Daw et al., 2006; Boorman et al., 2009); in these studies, activa-
tion in the PPC predicted switches in behavioral strategies.
Taken together, and consistent with cognitive hierarchy models
of action control (Burgess et al., 2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007;
Tsujimoto et al., 2011), these results suggest that the LFPC
Figure 5. Positive Functional Connectivity
with LFPC during Precommitment
(A) The PPI analysis showed that activity in DLPFC
and PPC correlated positively with the LFPC seed
during precommitment.
(B) Conjunction analysis revealed that regions
showing positive functional connectivity with
LFPC during precommitment (red) overlapped
with regions activated during willpower (blue).
Images are displayed at a threshold of p < 0.005
uncorrected with an extent of >10 voxels.
(C) Individual differences in impulsivity were posi-
tively correlated with the strength of connectivity
between LFPC and PPC (r = 0.90, p < 0.001).
(D) Individual differences in impulsivity were posi-
tively correlated with the strength of connectivity
between LFPC and DLPFC (r = 0.72, p < 0.001).
The correlation remains significantwhen excluding
the individual in the upper-right quadrant (r =
0.663, p = 0.002). See also Tables S4 and S6.
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values into actions via the PPC.
The benefits of precommitment were stronger for participants
with weak willpower, suggesting that precommitment may be a
viable alternative self-control strategy when willpower is consti-
tutively weak or situationally depleted. Neuroimaging data
showed that participants with weaker willpower displayed
stronger activation in the ventral striatum and vmPFC during
binding choices for larger delayed rewards, relative to
nonbinding choices for larger delayed rewards. These regions
have been consistently implicated in the computation of ex-
pected value (Haber and Knutson, 2010), suggesting that those
who stand to benefit more from precommitment encode those
benefits more strongly in the brain’s reward circuitry. This result
supports the idea that individuals possess a degree of self-
knowledge about their own self-control abilities—information
they may use when deciding whether to precommit—and fits
with previous studies implicating the LFPC in metacognition
(Fleming et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013) and the represen-
tation of anticipatory utility during intertemporal choice (Jimura
et al., 2013).
Notably, impulsive participants who stood to benefit more
from precommitment—those who were more likely to succumb
to temptation when attempting to exert willpower—showed
stronger positive connectivity between LFPC and willpower re-
gions during precommitment, relative to their cooler-headed
peers. Moreover, activation in the vmPFC during precommit-
ment mediated the relationship between impulsivity and LFPC-
DLPFC connectivity. These findings suggest that LFPC adap-
tively implements precommitment decisions as a function of
their expected value, consistent with its hypothesized role in
calculating the value of alternative courses of action (Boorman
et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2011).Neuron 79, 391–Theoretical models predict that
precommitment arises as a function of
learning about one’s own self-control
abilities (Kurth-Nelson and Redish,2010, 2012; Ali, 2011). In the current study, we were able to
show that between-subject differences in self-control abilities
moderated precommitment-related neural activity. Future work
might examine the within-subject dynamics of learning about
one’s own self-control abilities and how such learning relates
to precommitment. For example, one might dynamically manip-
ulate the difficulty of resisting temptations (thus making precom-
mitment more valuable at some times than others) and examine
how activation in LFPC and its connectivity with willpower re-
gions tracks with the expected value of precommitment on a
trial-to-trial basis. The LFPC may be involved in such learning
processes, given its role in self-awareness and metacognition
(Fleming et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013).
Although the anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10) is cytoarchi-
techtonically homogeneous, it may be functionally heteroge-
neous (Gilbert et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2013); for instance, studies
of metacognition (Fleming et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2013)
have reported activations in anterior prefrontal cortex that are
situated dorsal and medial to those reported in studies of coun-
terfactual value processing (Boorman et al., 2009, 2011). A
recent study of connectivity patterns within FPC found that the
lateral FPC (FPCl) showed strongest connectivity to DLPFC,
while the orbital FPC (FPCo) showed strongest connectivity to
the OFC and subgenual ACC (Liu et al., 2013). Notably, the
region we found to be associated with precommitment is located
precisely in the transition zone between FPCl and FPCo. This
region is therefore ideally situated to arbitrate between regions
involved in calculating expected value (OFC, subgenual ACC)
and regions involved in implementing self-control (DLPFC).
Fitting with this notion, we observed that LFPC was functionally
connected to DLPFC during precommitment and that the
strength of this connectivity was moderated by activation in
the vmPFC.401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 397
Figure 6. Mediation Analysis: Impulsivity, vmPFC Activation, and
LFPC Connectivity
vmPFC activation during precommitment (relative to LL choices in the Opt-Out
task) mediated the relationship between impulsivity (defined as the proportion
of SS choices in theWillpower task) and functional connectivity between LFPC
and DLPFC during precommitment (relative to LL choices in the Opt-Out task).
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. See also Tables S4, S5, and S6.
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longer delays (in the order of weeks to months), in contrast
with the shorter delays used in the current study. Future studies
might examine whether the precommitment to large rewards
with much longer delays engage similar neural processes as
those described in the current study. Given the role of the
LFPC in forward planning (Daw et al., 2006; Burgess et al.,
2007; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Boorman et al., 2009, 2011;
Rushworth et al., 2011; Tsujimoto et al., 2011), we might expect
to see even stronger effects in LFPC with longer delays than in
our current design, in which the shorter delays placed relatively
low demands on prospective cognition.
Self-control problems characterize a number of counterpro-
ductive behaviors, including substance abuse, overeating,
overspending, and procrastination. It remains unclear whether
these problems are the result of poor willpower, impaired ability
to precommit, or some mixture of both. Our method for
measuring willpower and precommitment in the same individ-
uals offers promising new avenues for understanding the mech-
anisms underlying self-control failures in the context of drug
abstinence, dieting, saving, and studying. Our behavioral para-
digm could be adapted to study self-control deficits in specific
groups (e.g., replacing erotic pictures with desirable foods to
study self-control in dieters). Knowing whether self-control
failures stem from impaired willpower versus precommitment
in various clinical populations could inform the development of
targeted behavioral or pharmacological interventions aimed at
improving function in the impaired faculty.
Finally, our finding that the ability to precommit facilitates the
pursuit of long-term goals has potential practical implications.
If organizations wish to promote future-minded decisions, they
could achieve this by providing opportunities to commit to de-
layed rewards in advance. One famous example already in place
is the ‘‘Save More Tomorrow’’ scheme, which enables em-
ployees to commit in advance allocations of future raises toward
retirement savings (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Entrepreneurs398 Neuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authorshave also realized that people value commitment opportunities
and are developing digital applications like SelfControl (http://
selfcontrolapp.com), which allows users to specify in advance
which websites they wish to prohibit their future selves from
browsing. Humans may be woefully vulnerable to self-control
failures, but thankfully, we are sometimes sufficiently far-sighted
to circumvent our inevitable shortcomings.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Healthy right-handed heterosexual males from Cambridge (n = 78, Study 1)
and Amsterdam (n = 28, Study 2), aged 18–35, gave informed consent and
participated in the study that was approved by the local departmental ethics
committee at the University of Cambridge (Study 1) and the University of
Amsterdam (Study 2). Participants were recruited through the general public
as well as the Universities of Cambridge and Amsterdam. Exclusion criteria
included current or past drug use, psychiatric or neurological disorders, MRI
contraindications, and red-green colorblindness. In Study 1 (Cambridge), we
excluded participants whose ratings of the stimulus set did not provide suffi-
cient variation to construct the required number of SS and LL stimuli (see
below for details); 58 subjects were available for analysis. In Study 2 (Amster-
dam), potential subjects rated the stimulus set online and only those whose
ratings allowed us to construct the required number of SS and LL stimuli
were invited for scanning. One subject was excluded due to a large temporal
lobe cyst revealed by the structural image. Two subjects were excluded for
revealing a recent use of recreational drugs. Two subjects were excluded
due to a programming error that resulted in a loss of task data. One subject
was excluded due to a back-wrapping artifact in the fMRI images that pre-
vented successful normalization. Finally, two subjects were excluded for
excessive movement in the scanner (>5 mm; all other subjects had movement
<3 mm). Twenty subjects were therefore available for the fMRI analysis.
Self-Control Task
In both experiments, participants made choices between smaller-sooner
rewards (SS) and larger-later rewards (LL) in four experimental task conditions
(Figure 1). Each condition had 42 trials, for a total of 168 trials. The trials
were presented across six runs, each consisting of blocks of seven trials of
all four experimental conditions, presented in random order within a run.
Participants were trained on all four task conditions before commencing the
experiment. Each condition was assigned a different color, which we used
to alert subjects to the upcoming condition at the start of each block (e.g.,
‘‘green task,’’ ‘‘red task,’’ ‘‘yellow task,’’ and ‘‘blue task’’). The assignment of
color to task condition was counterbalanced across subjects.
In all task conditions, participants faced choices between SS and LL
rewards. If the SS reward was chosen, an SS image was displayed immedi-
ately for 2,500 ms. If the LL reward was chosen, an LL image was displayed
for 2,500 ms after a variable delay, which could be short (4,000 ms), medium
(7,000 ms), or long (10,000 ms). We used relatively short, experienced
delays in order to be able to capture neural activation as subjects endured
the entirety of the delay period (Pre´vost et al., 2010). Each condition consisted
of 12 short, 18 medium, and 12 long trials. We included a higher number of
medium trials because pilot testing indicated that choices for LL were most
variable at medium delays. The length of the LL delay (short, medium, or
long) was indicated at the time of choice. Importantly, we further adjusted
the length of the intertrial interval (ITI) to fix the total length of each trial at
19,000 ms, regardless of whether the SS or the LL was chosen. Participants
therefore could not finish the task more quickly by choosing SS reward and
were instructed explicitly about this. Thus, to maximize reward in this para-
digm, participants should always choose LL.
All task conditions consisted of an initial decision phase (4,000 ms), a delay
phase (0–10,000 ms), a reward delivery phase (2,500 ms), and an ITI (at least
1,000ms; mean depended on subjects’ decisions). During the decision phase,
participants indicated their choice. If participants chose the SS, they immedi-
ately entered the reward delivery phase (i.e., delay = 0), followed by the ITI. If
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of the delay, participants could ‘‘collect’’ the reward by selecting the LL, at
which point they entered the reward delivery phase, followed by the ITI. Delay
and ITI lengths were variable (jittered) so that we could separate BOLD
responses associated with the decision phase, the delay phase, and the
reward phase.
For half the trials, the SS option was displayed on the left of the screen, and
the LL option was displayed on the right of the screen, with these positions
reversed for the other half of trials. Participants indicated their choices with
left- and right-button presses via keyboard (Study 1) or button box (Study 2).
Experimental Task Conditions
In the Willpower task (Figure 1A), we measured the effortful inhibition of im-
pulses to choose the SS. Participants did not make an explicit choice during
the initial phase but pressed a third key to enter the delay phase. Upon entering
the delay phase, the SS reward became available for selection, remaining so
for the duration of the delay. The LL reward was not available for selection until
the end of the delay phase. Participants could terminate the delay phase at any
time by selecting the SS, at which point they entered the reward delivery
phase, followed by the ITI. In order to select the LL reward, participants had
to resist the temptation to choose the available SS for the duration of the delay
until the LL reward became available.
In the Choice task (Figure 1B), participants initially made a simple choice be-
tween LL and SS during the decision phase. If SS was chosen, participants
entered the reward delivery phase, followed by the ITI. If LL was chosen, par-
ticipants entered the delay phase, followed by the reward delivery phase and
the ITI. Critically, the SSwas not available during the delay phase of the Choice
task. Thus, contrasting neural activity during the delay phase of the Willpower
task (in which the SS was available) with neural activity during the delay phase
of the Choice task should yield brain regions associated with the effortful inhi-
bition of impulses to choose the SS, controlling for LL reward anticipation
(which is matched across conditions).
In the Precommitment task (Figure 1C), which was inspired by the animal
literature (Rachlin and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974), during the decision phase
participants chose whether or not to make a binding choice for the LL
(‘‘commit’’). If participants chose to commit, they entered a delay phase during
which the SS was not available, followed by the reward delivery phase and the
ITI. If participants chose not to commit, they entered a delay phase during
which the SS was available for the duration of the delay, as in the Willpower
task. Thus, by choosing to commit, participants restricted their access to
the SS option during the delay period.
In the Opt-Out task (Figure 1D), participants made an initial choice between
LL and SS during the decision phase. If SS was chosen, participants entered
the reward delivery phase, followed by the ITI. If LL was chosen, participants
entered the delay phase during which the SS was available for the duration
of the delay, as in the Willpower task. Thus, choosing LL in this task was not
a binding choice, as participants could still ‘‘opt out’’ of their initial choice by
selecting SS at any point during the delay. Contrasting neural activity during
binding commitment choices in the Precommitment task with nonbinding LL
choices in the Opt-Out task should yield brain regions associated with pre-
commitment, controlling for LL reward anticipation (which is matched across
conditions).
Stimuli
Because our self-control task used experiential delays, for rewards we used
primary reinforcers that were consumable at the time of delivery, as is common
practice in the animal literature. We chose to use erotic images, based on a
previous study that examined temporal discounting with experiential delays
in humans (Pre´vost et al., 2010). Erotic images have advantages over alterna-
tive primary reinforcers, such as juice or food rewards (e.g., McClure et al.,
2004), in an fMRI setting. The consumption of edible rewards can create
fMRI movement artifacts; there may be individual variability in preferences
for the rewards, creating between-subject variability in hedonic value; and
subjects can become satiated on the reward. Using erotic pictures enabled
us to sidestep these issues. We were able to construct individualized stimulus
sets for each subject, to match the subjective value of SS and LL rewards, thus
minimizing between-subject variability in the hedonic value of the stimuli.Furthermore, we minimized the problem of satiation by never showing the
same image more than once.
Prior to completing the self-control task, participants provided pleasure
ratings on a Likert scale of 0–10 for a set of 400 images of women in lingerie
and swimwear (300 3 380 pixels, 24 bit color depth). We explicitly instructed
participants that a rating of 0 indicated that the image was not enjoyable, a
rating of 1 indicated neutral feelings toward the image, and ratings of 2–10 indi-
cated that the image was enjoyable (with 10 being most enjoyable). For each
participant, we discarded all images rated 0 or 1 and computed the median
rating for the remaining images. We then designated images rated above the
median as LL rewards and those rated below the median as SS rewards (Fig-
ure S2). Each participant thus received a personalized set of stimuli, with LL
rewards as their more highly rated images and SS rewards as less highly but
still positively rated images. Each stimulus set contained a sufficient number
of SS and LL images such that no image would be presented more than
once throughout the duration of the experiment (and subjects were explicitly
informed of this).
We note that all images used are freely available on the Internet. However,
subjects did not have free access to the images during testing, so they are
likely to have valued them highly at the time of delivery. This claim is corrobo-
rated by subjects’ self-reports and neural activity. The ratings for LL images
were significantly higher than for SS images (Exp. 1: t(57) = 44.276, p <
0.0001; Exp. 2: t(19) = 27.200, p < 0.0001; Table S1). A categorical comparison
of BOLD responses to LL reward onsets versus SS reward onsets indicated
that the LL rewards activated ventromedial PFC and ventral striatum more
strongly than SS rewards (Table S7), consistent with previous studies (Knutson
et al., 2008; Pre´vost et al., 2010).
Image Acquisition and Analysis
fMRIs were collected with a Phillips Intera 3.0T at the university hospital of the
University of Amsterdam using a standard six-channel SENSE head coil and a
T2* sensitive gradient echo (EPI) sequence (963 96matrix, repetition time [TR]
2,000ms, echo time [TE] 30ms, flip angle [FA] 80, 34 slices, 2.3 mm3 2.3mm
voxel size, 3-mm-thick transverse slices). Stimuli were presented using Eprime
1.2 software (Psychology Tools). The behavioral responses were collected by
an fMRI-compatible four-button response box (Lumitouch).
All image preprocessing and analysis was carried out in SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience). Images were realigned to the first
scan of the first session, spatially normalized via segmentation of the T1 struc-
tural image into gray matter, white matter, and CSF using ICBM tissue proba-
bility maps, and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full-width at
half-maximum).
We regressed fMRI time series onto a general linear model (GLM) with sepa-
rate regressors for decision onsets, delay periods, and reward onsets. We
modeled BOLD responses at decision onset as stick functions, conditioned
by task and choice (Willpower: SS or LL; Choice: SS or LL; Precommitment:
Commit, No Commit and choose SS, No Commit and wait for LL; Opt-Out:
SS, LL). For trials in which participants initially began to wait for LL but chose
SS during the delay period, we also modeled BOLD responses at SS choice
onset as stick functions. We modeled BOLD responses at delay onset as
boxcars set to the duration of the delay, conditioned by task and choice where
appropriate (Willpower, Choice, Precommitment-Commit, Precommitment-
No Commit, and Opt-Out). Finally, we modeled BOLD responses at reward
onset as stick functions, separated by reward type (SS versus LL). The full
model contained 17 regressors, each convolved with the canonical hemody-
namic response function, plus six motion regressors of no interest, multiplied
across six runs.
For the PPI analysis, we created an LFPC seed regressor by computing
individual average time series within a 4 mm sphere surrounding individual
subject peaks within the functional mask of left LFPC shown in Figure 4A.
The location of the peak voxels was based on the contrast of commitment
decisions in the Precommitment task versus LL choices in the Opt-Out task.
Variance associated with the six motion regressors was removed from the
extracted time series. To construct a time series of neural activity in left
LFPC, the seed time courses were deconvolved with the canonical hemody-
namic response function. We then estimated a PPI model with the following
regressors: (1) an interaction between the neural activity in LFPC and a vectorNeuron 79, 391–401, July 24, 2013 ª2013 The Authors 399
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Out LL); (2) the main effect of decision type; and (3) the original BOLD eigen-
variate (i.e., the average time series from the LFPC seed), as well as six motion
parameters as regressors of no interest.
To further investigate the results of the PPI analysis, we conducted a
conjunction analysis by finding the intersection of voxels that were significant
in the willpower contrast at p < 0.05 whole-brain cluster-level corrected and
that also showed significant precommitment-related functional connectivity
with LFPC at p < 0.001 uncorrected with an extent threshold of 10 voxels.
We tested for statistical significance using small-volume correction (p <
0.05, family-wise error corrected at the cluster level) in a priori regions of inter-
est (ROIs) identified from the literature in DLPFC, IFG, PPC, and LFPC (Table
S8). ROI masks were constructed as bilateral 10 mm spheres centered on
peak coordinates from previous studies of value-based decision making (Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures). We also note results outside our regions
of interest that survive whole-brain cluster-level corrections. Images are dis-
played at a threshold of p < 0.005, k > 10 to show the extent of activation in
the significant clusters. Results are reported using theMNI coordinate system.
For the ROI analyses, we extracted contrast-specific parameter estimates
for each ROI (identified from the literature, as above). To test for the effects
of condition on responses in each ROI, we conducted repeated-measures
ANOVA on the parameter estimates in SPSS v21. One subject was excluded
from this analysis for having parameter estimates more than two SDs higher
than the group mean. For the cross-region comparison ANOVA, we were not
interested in differences in average parameter estimates across regions but
rather in the within-region differences across tasks. We therefore first z trans-
formed the parameter estimates for each region separately by subtracting
each region 3 task parameter estimate from the mean parameter estimate
for that region (collapsed across tasks) and dividing by the SD of the parameter
estimates for that region across tasks.
For the mediation analysis, we used hierarchical linear regression as out-
lined in Baron and Kenny (1986). Indirect effects in the mediation model
were estimated using the SPSS procedure described in Preacher and Hayes
(2004). All parameter estimates used in the mediation analyses were extracted
from coordinates derived from previous studies (Table S8) to avoid noninde-
pendence issues. vmPFC parameter estimates were extracted from the
Precommit > Opt-Out LL contrast. DLPFC parameter estimates were
extracted from the PPI contrast (the interaction between the neural activity
in the LFPC seed and a vector coding for the main effect of decision type
[1 for Precommitment, 1 for Opt-Out LL]).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes two figures, eight tables, and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.05.028.
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